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Mortgages to Secure Future Advances.

Introduction--

It

has been for some time a well

settled

principle of law that Mortgages to secure future advances
if

or liabilities are equally as
made in

made

good faith

and free

binding and valid,

'rom fraud, as those

to secure a past or present indebtedness.
Their. adoption and extensive use have been the out-

growth of the requiremrents of trade and their special
adaptation to business transactions.
They have become a recognized form of security
throughout the United States, except perhaps in a very
few states where statutes have been passed forbidding
or restricting their use.
Parties are enabled by this means to arrange for
prospective dealings,

the ultimate character and scope

of which cannot be known or estimated at the time of
entering into the agreement, and securities of this nature avoid the necessity and expense of preparing new
articles of agreement for each separate dealing.
It is not unusual for a person who contemplates

entering into some project that
investment of considerable

will entail the
to mortgage his

capital,

property to his creditors as a security for debts to
be contracted, as well as for those already due, and by
so doing insure the payment of legitimate obligations.
Mortgages made in good faith, for the purpose of
securing creditors, have been generally sustained both
in early and recent cases by reason of their fairness
and consistency with comnon usage.
There is a great diversity of opinion with respect
to the subject of future advances, but this lack of harmony does not exist because of any question regarding
the validity of such mortgages in general, but for the
following
1.

reasons, viz.:
Whether or not the nature of the subject iratter

and the definite, amount to be

secured should be express-

ed on the face of the instrument.
2.

Whether such a mortgage

is to take precedence

over the subsequent liens of creditors, purchasers
incumbrance-s,for

advances made after

and

such subsequent

liens have attached.
In some states it is held to be essential to the

validity of such a mortgage that it should expressly
and distinctly specify on its face what it secures, so
that it would be unnecessary for a stranger to seek beyond the mortgage

to ascertainaliunde,

the required in-

f orma t i on.
Again, we find many courts holding

directly to

the contrary.
Others have held that a mortgage
to be made or liabilities to be

for future advances

incurred, when duly re-

corded, is valid and enforceable for all

indebtedness

entailed on the strength of it before actual notice of
the supervening rights of third persons.
many eminent

Then again

judges have held merely constructive notice

to be adequate.
The latter views have been qualified and a distinction made between mortgages, on the one hand, where the
constituent part of the agreement is the binding contract by which

the mortgagee is bound to make and the

mortgagor to accept such advances, wholly unaffected
by any change of circumstances, and the other class,
which is optional to the parties interested, whereby
there is no obligation on the one

side

to make and the

other to accept such advances.
The most important class
future advances
for at

is

of mortgages to secure

where the future advances arranged

the time of giving the security are designated

or designed by both parties to be made, provided the
general status of the parties remains unchanged, but
where

nevertheless

it

remains

mortgagor and mortgagee

optional with both the

to put an end to their

business

relations whenever such a course is deemed advisable,
sometimes by definite notice to that effect, or by simply treating their agreement as to future advances in
the light of a nullity, and of no binding force.
Under this category we

can include by far the great-

er number of cases ranged under
of mortgagees

to secure

great measure
important

embrace

future

the general denomination

advances,

and th-ey in

that class 'which is

a

practically

to the commercial world.

It will be here attempted to present the leading
features

of this

ner as possible,

subject
and in

in

as concise

and lucid a man-

order to do so in

something

like a systematic way the subject will be treated under
the following heads, viz.;
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I.

Whether the purpose of a mortgage to secure

future advances

should be

stated on its

face

;

II. What evidence independent of the deed is admissible
ment

to interpret and explain the terms of the agree-

;
III.

whether or not the utmost limit of the lien

should be specified
IV.

As to what notice is sufficient to charge the

mortgagee with knowledge of

the rights of

a subsequent

incuirbranc er.

I.

W1hat language

in

the deed itself

is

necessary

and sufficient to create such a security ?
There is some little conflict among the authorities
regarding the necessity

of stating the purpose of the

arIreemnent upon the face of the instrument, and numerous
cases could be cited holding that the omission to state
fully and clearly the object would in itself be sufficient to render the mortgage invalid for the purpose
for which it

was executed

:

but the more moderate and

reasonable doctrine, and that which is accepted by
the great preponderance of authority, is,

that where

there is a definite and determined ainount expressed in
the instrunent,

which the mortgage

is

given to secure,

there would seem to be no imperative need for stating
whether the amount so specified was to

cover a past in-

debtedness or for the purpose of obtaining future advances.
Some writers have endeavored to draw a distinction
between the principle of making a mortgage to be a security for subsequent advances as between the parties
themselves, and that of giving it the same

extended ap-

plication when employed against third persons.
Though the mortgage need not necessarily express
that

it

was given as

or liabilities

to be

security

for advances to be made

incurred by future endorsements,

still the extent of the lien intended to be created
should be described with a reasonable degree of certainty ; but the condition need not be so definite as to
preclude the necessity of extraneous inquiry---it is
sufficient if enough is stated so that by exercising
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ordinary prudence and diligence in consulting the mortgagee the nature and amount of his incunbrance can be
ascertained and all

requisite information gained ; so

that there can be no justifiable reason for establishing
a different principle of law for the guidance of third
persons holding other liens upon
applied

the-estate,72

to the parties to the instrument

that

themselves.

Though it is not necessary that the mortgage should
express on its face the objec

for which it is given,

still it would be better to state such object in the
mortgage, as such omission, though not affecting the
validity of the instrument, renders it liable to suspicion and imposes upon the mortgagee much stricter
of the payment of

the consideration than if such

proof
pur-

pose had been clearly and definitely stated.
The form of the security varies considerably and is
governed by the attendant circunstances of each case,
but the general rule of law is now perfectly well settled
that a mortgage to secure future advances may be given
in

the form of a gross sum expressed on the face of the

instrument, as representing a present indebtedness
and as it frequently happens that this indebtedness
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arises out of complicated transactions, where it would
be exceedingly difficult if not absolutely impossible
to

describe the securities or the debts except in this

general way, such a description will be deemed sufficient
as against subsequent incumbrancers, purchasers and
creditors.
What more could rightfully be reqiuired of the prior
mortgagee than that he should give the subsequent incumbrancer fair and reasonable notice of the utmost possible ainount of his lien ?

Should the supervening in-

cumbrancer feel disposed to do so, he could readily ascertain from the mortgagee the exact amount of his claim
within the

mnount

specified in

he feel so inclined,

the mortgage,

he could treat the mortgage as se-

curity for the whole ainount named.

In either case he

could not possibly suffer any injury.
gage in

any event is

or should

The prior mort-

only a lien for the actual amount

of the indebtedness existing between the parties at the
particular time,

and it

cannot make an possible differ-

ence to the incumbrancer whether such indebtedness existed at the time of the execution of the mortgage,

,/

or was created by subsequent advances.
It

is

to be observed with no small degree

of satis-

faction that the courts have exhibited a commendable
disposition to recognize any form of security which was
executed in good faith and relied upon at, and subsequent to,

the time the advances wore made.

In a leading Anerican case upon the subject :
Shirras vs Caig 7 Cranch 64. A mortgage given presumably
as security for

30,000 pounds sterling, but with the

real purpose of securing various debts existing and
due at the time from particular

mortgagees, advances

afterwards to be made and liabilities to be incurred to
an uncertain amount
against future

; the security was held valid as

incumbrancersand creditors even as

to

future advances made before notice of any intervening
equity.
A mortgage

To secure

suns due and to become due

held sufficient.
Insurance Co. vs Brown 11 Mich. 266.
The following was held to be sufficient
all past indebtedness due and owing."
Machette vs Wanless 1 Col. 225.

"to secure
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"Vhat I may owe him on book"
future accruing accounts after
there was nothing owing at

it

was construed to mean
was

ascertained that

the time.

MJcDaniels vs Colvin 16 Vt.
A mortgage for the payment

300.

of such sums of money

as the mortgagee might advance in pursuance of an agreemnent mentioned in the condition of a certain bond given
by the mortgagee

to the mortgagor of even date,

contains

reasonable notice of the incumnbrance.
Crain vs Deming 7 Conn. 387.
Mix vs Cowles 20 Conn. 420.
When it has been shown that the mortgage was given
in

whole or

the burden

in

part as security

for future advances,

of proof rests upon the mortgagee to show

the amount which has been advanced.

The next question to be
II.
is

:

Yhat evidence independent of the deed itself

admissible

agre ement

considered is

to interpret

and explain

the terms of the

;

It is a general rule that parol evidence cannot
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be given to deny or contradict a written contract, but
to this rule there are some exceptions

:

e.g. It has been

held in many cases that parol evidence can be given to
contradict or explain a mere receipt,and this principle
has long since been extended to the acknowledgement of
the payment

of the consideration

And again the occurrences
evidence

is

amitted,

ten contract,
and intent
dence

is

but to

as represented

are very frequent where

not to vary or contradict
indicate

a deed
parol

a writ-

and explain the purpose

for which it was executed

:e.g.

admitted to show that a deed,

its face, was

in

Where

evi-

absolute upon

intended merely as a security for money.

The authorities seem to agree almost

universally

that when a mortgage has been made to secure an existing
debt or liability, parol evidence

is admissible to prove

the identity of the debt or obligation intended to be
secured by the parties, and the fact that such evidence
differs
deed,

materially from the written description in
would not affect

the competency of such

evidence.

Therefore where a mortgage expresses on its face
it

is

given as security for a

certain,

the

that

fixed sum of

money,

it

may be shown that its

purposo was

to secure

advances which were to be made subsequent to
tion of the instrument,
to make

and the fact that the

the execuagreement

and accept such advances was made verbally, will

not be detrimental
conclusion is

to the

rights

of the mortgagee.

This

reached from the fact that supervening

purchasers or incumbrancers must have consulted the
records and therefore
the fact that

could not have been ignorant of

the prior mortgagee had a

property mentioned as security,

claim on the

and such

knowledge

naturally have been obtained before giving credit

;

therefore

there seems to be no valid r'eason why the

mortgagee

should not have priority

of advances made and liabilities
the terms of the agreement
not exceed the amount

to

the full

must

extent

incurred according to
; providing -uch claim does

specified in

the mortgage.

Chancellor Kent 4 Kent's Commentaries 176,says :
"So a mortgage
"a

or judgment may be taken and held as

security for future advances and responsibilities

"to the extent of it,

when this is

a

consistent part

"of the original agreement, and the future advances
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"will be covered by the lien in preference to the
"claim of the junior intervening incunbrancer with
"notice of the ag4reement."
III.

Another fruitful field

of discussion is the

question as to whether or not the utmost amount of the
lien should be specified in the mortgage.
The decisions on this point are equally as conflicting as those bearing on the necessity of expressing the
purpose of the agreement.
In
mor tgage

a number of cases it

has been held that where a

expresses on its face that it was executed

for the purpose of securing future advances, it is essentially necessary that it should also state the ultimate
extent of such advances ; otherwise it would be invalid.
Pettibone vs Griswold 4 Conn. 158.
Garber vs Henry 7 Wfatts 57.
The great weight of authority,however,

at the pres

ent time tends the other way, and with the exception of
a few states the courts strongly favor the opposite
theory ; that where a mortgage expresses on its face
that it is to secure furture advances the utmost limit

of such advances need not be expressed.
Robinson vs Williarns 22 N Y.

680.

Witczinski vs Everman 51 M.iss.

841/846.

1 Jones on Mortgages 367 and note.

If

the mortgage contains enough to show an agree-

ment that is to be regarded as a security to the mortgagee for such subsequent dealings as may - be entered into
by the party,

it

will be sufficient warning to put a

future purchaser or creditor upon inquiry, and if he
should fail
dence in

to exercise due diligence and ordinary pru-

making the investigation, he cannot claim the

equities of a bona fide purchaser.
With our present system of recording, a mortgage,
innediately on being filed, becomes a notice
world of its contcnts ;

to the

until discharged it stands as a

security for all indebtedness which it covers, accruing
between the mortgagor and mortgagee.

A person consult-

ing the record is put upon inquiry to ascertain the

amount of the liability which the mortgage was given to
secure ; having been advised of the claims of the mortgagee, it would, under the circumstances, be

folly on
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the part of a third person to voluntarily buy or accept,
as security, a deed of the mortgaged property.
The senior mortgagee having

secured himself by a

mortgage which, on being duly recorded, recited facts
sufficient to give supervening incumbrancers reasonably
fair means of ascertaining fall infonnation regarding
the extent of his

claims,

such subsequent

incuinbrancers

would be subordinated to the paramount rights of such
prior mortgagee.
There have been strong expressions

of disapproval

by some writers claiming that a mortgage not stating
the utmost limit

of the prospective

advances

conflicts

with and defeats the main purpose of our registry laws,
and that instead of the record serving as a guide

to

subsequent creditors or purchasers by making known the
real transaction, it contravenes and leads them astray
by purporting to show what it does not do in effect.
Many persons seem to have a very erroneous idea as
to the object and purpose of the recording

acts.

When

the idea of the recording of written instrunents was
first conceived, it was most assuredly never intended by
the leg:islature

that

the register

should show the actual

ainount due from time

and the

to time upon a mortgage,

idea which was then formulated has not,

that I

can disA mort-

cover, undergone any change in this particular.

gage may be half paid a week after it is executed, and
so only half

the amount be due upon it

as it

stands

upon the record, or it may be a mortgage of long standing with
it,

so

a considerable accumulation of interest upon

that the amount

ed on the record :

is

much larger than

that

express-

yet no person would venture to assert

that simply because the record does not at all times express the actual amount due on the respective mortgages
it

must therefore be charged with holding out a false

light to misguide and embarrass those who consult

it,

and by so doing fail most signally in accomplishing the
purpose for which it

was

created.

"If the means of ascertaining the extent of the
lien are pointed out in the mortgage it is enough."
Allen vs Lathrop 46 Ga. 133.

IV.

The most important

remaining inquiry is in

regard to whether or not actual notice is necessary to
limit advances.
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It is a well settled principle of law that, when
the mortgagee has for a consideration undertaken to make,
and the mortgagor bound himself to accept, certain future advances, such advances when made will relate back,
and the mortgage will be a good and valid security for
advances made and liabilities incurred against supervening purchasers, creditors and incumbrancors having

no-

tice of the prior mortgage.
Again, where there is no obligation between the
parties, and the making and acceptance of such advances
or liabilities are entirely optional, and the mortgagee
has actual notice of a subsequent conveyance or incumnbrance of the mortgaged premises before making advances
or incurring liabilities, his security would not be good
as against such subsequent incutnbrancers.
But whether the senior mortgagee in a purely voluntary agreement,

where

the making and accepting

of th

advances are entirely optional, shall hold the mortgaged
property as security for advances made after the making
and recording of the subsequent mortgage, is a much
mooted question in the courts of the various states
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indeed there is no question which has yet arisen on the
subject of future advances which has caused the same
amount of vexed discussion and been marked by such diversity of opinion as that bearing upon the legal sufficiency of notice from a supervening incunbrancer or
creditor to a prior mortgagee in a purely optional agreement for future advances.
Judge Redfield, in treating of the subject in a
veiy full and clear exposition of the principles -and
authorities, says : "The general view of the American
"uourts and uniform declaration of the English courts
"as far as we know, is, nothing short of notice in fact
"of the subsequent mortgage will have the effect of
"postponing advances made by the first mortgagee in favor
"of constructivenotice

of the intervening security

: it

"is expressed under various forms of language, but the
"result of the whole is

that if

the first

mortgagee have

"knowledge of the existence of a second mortgage upon
"the estate, he cannot give further credit upon his
'prior mortgage, provided it is entirely optional with
"him whether to make further advances or not."
2 An. Law Rep. N. S. 19.

The same writer in a note to Boswell vs Goodwin,
Ain. Lar Rep. N. S, 92
mortgagee

; favors the rule that a senior

to secure future advances

should be gcverned

by a constructive notice of a subsequent mortgage which
had been duly recorded, and that his priority of lien
would be of no avail for optional advances made afterwards.

The learned judge says

:

"e

never have been

"able to coanprehend the hardship of requiring the prior
"mortgagee to secure future advances to take notice of
"the state of the registry at the time he makes the ad"vance."
There would

be no questioning the reasonableness

of this doctrine in cases where the advances are to be
made at long intervals of time and in
determinate sums.

definite and

It is conceded that under such cir-

cumstances the prior mortgagee could have no just excuse
for failing to notice the state of the register, if the
law so required.

But if, on the other hand, such ad-

vances were to be made daily or hourly, as is frequently
the case in continuous dealings wiGh bankers and brokers,
;he mortgagee would be compelled to keep a running accounG which would be constantly changing its balance.

Under

such circumstances the mortgagee

actual notice

of a

ought to have

subsequent mortgage.

The requirement

that one should constantly watch the register in such a
case, would either impose

such an arduous duty and in-

convenience upon the mortgagee as to render it scarcely
less
such

than a burdensome

task,

or it

would tend to make

continuing security of little avail.
As it

is

necessary

to have

a uniform rule govern-

ing both classes of cases, which would merit the approval
of business men,
their

and at the same

ideas of right

and justice;

time

coimnend itself

no better

to

can probably

be suggested than that which is sanctioned by the weight
of authority.
Every subsequent purchaser knows that he is

compel-

led to consult the record at his peril, and having examin
ed it,
lien

he is
upon

immediately notified

of -he preexisting

the property and therefore,

he having such

notice, and the mortgagee being totally ignorant of the
contemplated purchase, why should not the subsequent
purchaser, who bargained with his eyes open as to the
claim of the mortgagee,
that might arise

from

be compelled to sustain any loss
the foolishness of his act

?
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To a

subsequent

incumbrancer

who advanced money on the

mortgaged property it might be said :

you saw the

record of the prior mortgage and know what
to secure

it

was given

; you voluntarily advanced your money

subject

to the prior incumbrance, and you cannot now be preferred
to any part of it.

Ile would unquestionably in the

plainest equity be bound to give notice of such intervening interest or suffer the consequences of his negligence.
To make it

imperative upon the senior mortgagee,

after he has duly recorded his mortgage,
"ries before he act's,

to make inqui-

lest he might perchance injure

some one, would be imposing the duty of notice and negligence upon the wrong person, as it would be compelling
the prior

mortgagee

to perform a

duty for the junior

mortgagee which the latter should in all fairness be
constrained to do for himself.

It

would be inequitable

to allow such subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer,
having notice of the record,

to claim a preference

over

the senior mortgagee, who has made endorsements or advanced moneys upon the faith of the mortgage, after

the

second inci-nbrancer,
right

in ignorance of the supervening

or title.
The general principle of construction of the regis-

try laws upon the point of notice, is that the registration of incumbrances is notice
cers only.

to subsequent incumnbran-

Such notice is prospective not retrospective

in its operation.
Chancellor Greene in 7fard vs Cooke, 17 N. J. Equity
79 says

:

"A mortgage

given to secure future advances,

"duly registered, is good not only as against the rnortga"gor, but is entitled to priority over subsequent incum"brances for all advances made prior to the notice of
"the subsequent incumbrance

; and the notice must be an

"actual and not a constructive notice."
In Shirras vs Caig 7 Cranch 51.

The Supreme Court

of the United States held :"That a mortgage

given for

"future advances was a security for all advances made
' "anti liabilities incurred upon its faith prior to' the
"receipt of actual notice

of the subsequent title."
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There are a few general principles which, not having a rlace under any particular head, will bear incidental mention before closing this treatise on the
subject of future advances.
of a mortgage

The validity

to secure

future advan-

ces is not in any way affected by the fact that such
advances were to be made in

another

commodity than money,

or that the advances are to be made to a third person
at the solicitation of the mortgagor.
Where a grantee purchases subject to a mortgage
for future advances, which

the mortga,ee has bound him-

self to make, such mortgage will stand as a lien for
the amount agreed upon,

even though the advances have

not been made at the time of the purchase.
It is now well settled in this state that any
debtor, whether solvent or insolvent, may, when acting
in

good faith,

mortgage

a part or the whole

of his pro-

perty as security for future loans or advances.
When a party by virtue of a mortgage obtains additional security for a preexisting debt, it is to be regarded as a valid

consideration

for his

promise to

assume certain liabilities, and the agreement is not
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optional but compulsory on his part, because there is a
leg;al oblifgation on him to perform his ag!recment.
In reference

to agreements for additional advances

made subsequent to the execution of the mortgage.Where the original agreement

between the mortgagor

and mortgagee is in the form of an absolute deed, and
the conditional defeasance is made by parol, a subsequent agreement
make

to

the effect

that the mortgagee

should

further advances or incur additional liabilities

on the same security,
tween the parties.

would be valid and binding as be-

But, should the instrument state

definitely the amount which it

was given to secure,

it

could not afterwards be construed to represent other
than the ainount to be stated.
any subsequent agreement
as security for a

Under such circumstances

that the mortgage

sum additional

to

should stand

that named,

would be

invalid and of no binding force even as between the original parties, because the mortgage being clear and explicit

in

its

terms speaks

for itself,

and under no cir-

cumstances can the written evidence of one contract be
admitted as competent evidence to deny or contradict
another.

